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This book by Richard Kay is a joy to read. It is a study of
England's Glorious Revolution in the late seventeenth century
written by an American law professor with a well-known
expertise in constitutional law and constitutional interpretation. 3
It works on at least three levels. Firstly, there is the legal history
side of the book. Kay started work on this book in the early 1990s,
so what you read is the culmination of nearly a quarter-century of
research, reading and thought. Those who have little idea of the
events leading up to England's Glorious Revolution will learn all
the basics. Meanwhile, those who had a pretty solid understanding
will learn new things. Kay is good on the importance of oaths back
then. Kay is good on how terribly King 1ames II played his hand;
how a Catholic King in an overwhelmingly Protestant kingdom
made mistake after mistake after mistake until it was too late and
he had to flee. Kay is good on the Convention Parliament. Kay is
good on the lurking background importance of Cromwell and the
events of 1648-1660 to what would happen some three decades
later. Kay even helped clear up for me a vague confusion I had
never really bothered to sort out. Why is it that you sometimes
would read of some event linked to the Glorious Revolution, say
the Declaration of Rights, as having taken place in 1688 and at

1. Wallace Stevens Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
2. Garrick Professor of Law, T.C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland.
3. See, e.g., Richard Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, X2 Nw.U. L. REV. 226 (199X); "Originalist"
Values and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 335 ( 1996); Original
Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 703
(2009).
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other times see that same event being dated to 1689? It was the
calendar and from when the start of the new year is dated. While
the French had moved over to the more accurate Gregorian
calendar in the 1580s, the English were still on the Julian (and
would remain on the Julian till the 1750s). Under the latter, the
start of the new year was then March 25, not 1anuary 1. In
addition, by the time of the events of the Glorious Revolution
there was a ten day difference between the two callendars. Taken
together, some of what we today would say had happened in 1689
would back then in England (or in the 13 colonies, for that matter)
be said to have taken place in 1688.
There is a second side to this book, however, because as
Kay makes clear "[t]his book is . . . a legal history of the
Revolution" (p. ix, emphasis in the original). Yes, the history
matters, but it matters to Kay because of the way it illustrates just
how important law was to the revolutionaries and, relatedly, how
crucial legal justifications for their actions were to them. This is
not surprising, as Kay's very first sentence in the book, in the
Preface, is: "I came to the study of the Glorious Revolution of
1688-89 from the study of constitutional law" (p. ix). Likewise, it
is not surprising that this book can also be thought of as an
extended study of constitutional law issues. There are questions
related to parliamentary sovereignty. There are questions about
what constitute the sources of law. There are all the issues thrown
up by the tensions between change and continuity, between those
who appeal to theory and those to history, and between the
exhilarating attraction of wide-open unconstrained scope for
action, as opposed to the comforting safety provided by the
constraints of the established law. There is even much discussion
of the conduct of judges in resolving these issues, which
tangentially brings up all the issues of interpretation which
constitutional law scholars ponder on a daily basis. There are all
these, plus consideration of the Rule of Law's consistency with
revolutionary change, and more. Despite the focus on events in
England nearly 330 years ago, this is very much a book for those
interested in contemporary constitutional law.
Then there is the jurisprudential side of this book. On a third
level, you can read this book as an exercise in applied legal
philosophy. "What counts as law?" is a constant refrain. So too is
the desire to mask revolutionary change, to finesse it and pretend
that there is continuity, when pretty much everyone knows that
there is not. There is the persistence of legal argument in the midst
of bootstrap operations at the start of new legal regimes. And
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perhaps most perplexingly, there is the fundamental issue of how
to understand what H.L.A. Hart dubbed "the rule of
recognition. " 4
I came to read Kay's book as a law professor who teaches
both constitutional law and jurisprudence courses in Australia.
Before that, I worked and taught broadly similar courses in New
Zealand, Canada, Hong Kong and about the United Kingdom
(while living in Hong Kong). I mention that because, on the
straightforward plane of knowing the Westminster constitutional
model, it struck me that Kay knows more than most British,
Canadian, Australian and New Zealand legal academics. He
certainly knows the Westminster system inside and out.
In the rest of this short review, therefore, I will play to my
strengths and focus on the second and third sides to this book, the
aspects related to constitutional law and to legal philosophy. I will
pick out just three themes raised in Kay's book, note why these
three were important back in the late 1600s in England, and then
consider them more widely in today's world.
1. FICTIONS AND FINESSING

The revolutionaries in 1688 were overwhelmingly not
outsiders. They had a big stake in the existing system. Core
religious differences with King James II, and the birth of a son of
his sure to be raised a Catholic, led the makers of the Revolution
to act. Yet the failed experiment with Cromwell was within living
memory for many of these actors. It worried almost all of them.
As Kay puts it, "By 1688, almost everyone had learned that
contempt for the law could lead to disaster" (p. 56, internal
footnote omitted). Accordingly, there was "a powerful tendency
to favor, so far as practicalities allowed, the apparently legal over
the openly revolutionary" (p. 56).
With the arrival of William and Mary, James II's flight to
France, and a new but precarious equilibrium beginning to form,
the Convention Parliament met during the interregnum. Yet the
legal status of this Convention was itself dubious, highly dubious.
Indeed the calling, meeting and decision-making of this
Convention Parliament of January and February 1689 required
some sort of legal justification to be given, since Parliaments were
called into being by the King with his issuing of the writs, and that
plainly had not occurred. Likewise legal justification was also
4.

H. L. A. HART, TilE CONCEPT OF LAW Y7, YY (1% I).
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needed for the severing of the hereditary principle, the core
constitutional pillar that kings were not chosen nor elected but
given by God (as it were). In both instances, the makers of the
Revolution were pushed to fall back on fictions and the finessing
or ignoring of questions that were otherwise unanswerable.
Meanwhile the sort of law that was appealed to and relied upon
to justify the new order generally depended upon how much those
doing the appealing desired change:
Notwithstanding some undeniable exceptions, those who
wished the fewest changes in constitutional arrangements
tended to refer to positive law which was specific, concrete and
historically identifiable - statutes, judgments, precedents.
Advocates of more far-reaching changes in the distribution of
constitutional authority were more likely to cite a vaguer and
more abstract kind of law- natural law, broad principles, and
the practices of an immemorial, and thus unverifiable, past (pp.
57-58).

Loosely speaking, the mapped spectrum of wanting-fewestconstitutional-changes-to-most ran from Jacobites through Tories
through Whigs to Radical Whigs. However, all but committed
supporters of James at one end and outright and outspoken
radical revolutionaries at the other were forced to appeal to
constitutional fictions, to finesse the seemingly illegal, and
sometimes simply to assert what was patently not the case.
Take the above-mentioned hereditary principle and how the
makers of the Glorious Revolution might characterize its seeming
breach. The Convention Parliament considered three
alternatives. One was an appeal to an "original contract" 5 (pp. 7784) between ruler and ruled. If such a contract existed, then its
breach by King James II would go some way to justifying the fact
the Crown had passed to James's Protestant daughter Mary and
her co-religionist husband William. This type of approach to
justifying the inroads made to the otherwise inviolable hereditary
principle was very much in line with the thinking of John Locke
(pp. 78, 112). Yet, at the time, this option for revolutionrationalizing was seen as too radical by most (including by most
Whigs) and downright implausible by some:
William Atwood, a Whig barrister, was a popular and
influential apologist for the Revolution. He drew conclusions
remarkably similar to those of Locke, asserting, for example,
that in the "last resort," judgment "must needs be in the
5.

Today we would talk in terms of a social contract rather than original contract.
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people, the question being of the exercise of their original
power" so that "their voice is as the voice of Ciod." But for
Atwood this argument was derived "not only from the equity
of the law but from the very letter ... ". In contrast to the ''letter
of the law," he distrusted "thin and metaphysical notions" of
natural right "which few arc masters of and judges of," and he
described the concept of "inherent and unalienable rights of
mankind" as "wheedling" (p.79, internal footnotes omitted).

Put bluntly, John Locke and his original contract thinking
amounted to little more than fringe players in supporting and
justifying the Glorious Revolution (p. 113).
A second possibility for the makers of the Revolution was to
appeal to the law of nations, to suggest that this then nascent sort
of international law, somehow or other, trumped the longestablished constitutional law of England which had the
hereditary principle at its core (pp. 84-88). The trick was to look
here for some sort of "legal" basis supporting a general right of
resistance. Now at core "the similarity [of these sort of arguments]
... to those of some home-grown exponents of the abstract
contract was painfully clear" (p. 87). Hence, this type of appeal to
international law horrified the Tories and won very few takers
even amongst the Whigs. This option was also a flop in the
Convention Parliament.
The third option was to say, with as straight a face as
possible, that King James II had abdicated-that he had vacated
the throne when he had fled to France. This was the home of the
outright legal fiction, the careful finessing of the seeming rupture
in what the Constitution demanded. It was where misgovernment
would be transmogrified into voluntary resignation by a
"transubstantiating vote" (p. 169) of the Convention Parliament.
It was also the option that was overwhelmingly the most popular,
for Whigs nearly as much as Tories, and the one that was chosen.
Just assert that the hereditary principle had not been breached
because King James II had voluntarily abdicated his Crown.
When James fled he had effected his own demise. No, his fleeing
had done more than that. He had effected his own demise as well
as that of his new born son, a Catholic, whose rights were also
forfeited and who would henceforth be mentioned as sparingly as
possible (p. 279).
Of course it was not just the makers of the Glorious
Revolution who could find these three items on the "how to
rationalize your revolution" menu. The makers of any
revolution -slow-moving, subtle and peaceful ones as much as
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the abrupt, overt and violent- might use thern. They might
attempt to justify their actions 1) by appeal to amorphous natural
law principles by way of some sort of hypothetical original or
social contract; 2) by appeal beyond domestic law to the norms of
international law; or 3) by reliance on the out-and-out fiction that
they have not really done anything revolutionary, not really, and
when pressed finesse as many precedents and constitutional
principles as possible.
We can see this only eight decades later in the successful
revolution that followed the American War of [ndependence.
When it came to justifying the American actions, Locke and his
theories came into their own for the makers of that revolution.
Meanwhile, if we shift to more recent times and the types of nearly
imperceptible revolutions occasioned when top judges interpret a
written constitution to produce answers few honesdy believe that
Constitution actually dictated, we will sometimes see appeals to
internationallaw 6 and sometimes the use of outright fictions and
finessing. The latter occurs where top judges reach interpretive
conclusions that markedly depart from the prior understanding of
what the Constitution means. 7
2. JUDGES AND PARLIAMENT
Before the Glorious Revolution, the monarch was not
unconstrained in what he or she could do. Parlian1ent had some
checking power, it was just unclear how much. So while it was
the religious issue that provided the political substance of the
grievances of 1688, the constitutional point on which issue was
joined was the dispensing and suspending powers that James
invoked to relieve Catholics of the disabilities imposed by
statute. The dispute was yet another iteration of the stillunresolved question of the extent to which royal power could
be exercised unilaterally (p. 40).

fl. For a sample of cases that do this, sec Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) in
the United States; Al-Kateh v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 in Australia; and R. v. Hapc
1200712 SCR 291 in Canada. See also James Allan, Ineffective, Opaque and Undemocratic:
The IOUs of-Too Much-Internationall.aw and Why a Bit of Skepticism is Warranted,
50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. X33 (2013).
7. For the United States, sec Roc v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); in Australia,
"implied rights" cases including Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth
(1992) 177 CLR 106; for Canada, sec Reference Re Supreme Court Act,§§ 5 and fl, 2014
sse 21, or Carter V. Canada (AG) 2015 sse 5.
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In other words, what was the scope of the king's unfettered regal
discretion? Or, in different terms, what was the relative authority
of the King and what was that of Parliament (p. 131 )?
The Glorious Revolution, the Bill of Rights, and then
Parliament's laying down of the line of succession in the Act of
Settlement 1701 made it clear that whatever the limits on the King
had been before, a good deal more of them existed afterwards. In
fact, the trajectory of the coming into being of the doctrine and
core British constitutional principle of Parliamentary
Sovereignty-a doctrine and principle which was not some gift of
the judges and the common law, as Jeffrey Goldsworthy has made
clearx- takes off after the Glorious Revolution. If one's time
horizon is the medium-to-long-term, Parliament was the big
winner from this revolution.
That said, being a judge in revolutionary times is an
employment fraught with danger. Kay does an excellent job
outlining some of these difficulties. Take the pre-revolutionary
judges of the King's Bench who heard the Godden v Hales case in
1686, an important case on the dispensing power in which all but
one of the judges agreed in the judgment given in favor of the
King. These judges ended up on the wrong side of events; they
had given a judgment on a highly contentious issue that would be
_mentioned and condemned in Prince William of Orange's
invasion declaration. Similarly, " [t]he participating judges,
William Garroway would later claim in the Commons, were guilty
of 'a breach of their oath, and a great one"' (p. 41, internal
footnote omitted). In fact, Kay devotes a good chunk of the fourth
chapter of this five-chapter book to the subsequent treatment of
the judges who had participated in that case. In general terms, it
will surprise no one to learn that having been a judge who had
been dismissed by James, or who had resigned, in no way hurt
one's post-revolutionary prospects in later William and Mary
days. If your usual framework for thinking about the role of
judges in revolutionary times is Apartheid South Africa, England
in 1688 and 1689 offers a nice change.
Meanwhile, what can be said of parliamentary sovereignty
in today's world? This is the core notion, uncontroversially at the
heart of the British Constitution until well past World War II, that
there are no legal or constitutional constraints on what the elected
parliament can do, only moral and political limits. Now
parliamentary sovereignty no doubt waxed after the Glorious
X.

JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT

(1YY9).
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Revolution. Yet in quite recent times it has appeared to wane in
the United Kingdom. There was Britain's entry into the then
European Economic Community, now European Union,
formalized with the passage of the European Cmnmunities Act
10
1972. 9 There was the House of Lords Factortame case, making
clear that in the light of that statute, certainly on day-to-day
matters, English law would be read as consistent with European
law-meaning that this 1972 statute's incorporation of such law
could trump later statutes (or at least those not explicitly taking
the U.K. out of the E.U.), thereby driving a truck through the
doctrine of implied repeal. There was the Blair government's
11
innovation of a statutory bill of rights. This statutory bill of
rights, unlike the entrenched American or Canadian models, does
not allow statutes to be invalidated, or struck down. And yet by
means of a New Zealand-style "reading down provision" -or
"read all other statutes as consistent with the enumerated rights if
12
it is at all possible" directive to the judges - and a Declaration of
13
Incompatibility provision,
the power balance between
Parliament and the unelected judiciary has altered significantly.
Some U.K. legal academics, such as Aileen Kavanagh, now say
that the top British judges are just as powerful as top American
15
14
ones. There were also the Blair government's Scotland Act and
16
and the Cameron
Judicial Appointments innovations,
17
government's fixed terms between elections legislation. And of
course there was the Blair/Brown government's signing of the
Lisbon Treaty. 1x

9. European Communities Act 1972 (U.K.).
10. R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd I19H9l2 All ER 692.
11. The Human Rights Act 199H (U.K.).
12. !d. at§ 3.
13. /d. at § 4. The judges arc made the arhiters of what is rights-respecting and then
can declare that some statute is, in their view, not rights-respecting. The legislature is
thereafter left with the option of doing nothing, and hence, given thi:s framework, hcing
deemed to he taking away people's rights. Or the legislature can amend the infringing
statute. Well over two dozen such declarations have hcen made. To the hest of my
knowledge the Parliament has stood up to the judges only once.
14. See AILEEN KAVANAGII, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE U.K. HUMAN
RIG I ITS ACT (2009).
15. Scotland Act 19HH (U.K.). This statute is rcpcalahle in theory. Parliament has the
legal and constitutional power to do so. But it is not ahle to he repealed as a matter of
political practice. There is no plausihle way for the Parliament in London to take hack
these "more powers to Scotland" reforms.
16. Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (U.K.). This statute created the Judicial
Appointments Commission.
17. Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011 (U.K.).
1H. European Union (Amendment) Act 200H (U.K.).
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After all of those changes, in what sense can we say today
that the United Kingdom parliament is sovereign? Certainly it is
so in a less full-blooded sense than half a century ago. Yes, were
Parliament to enact legislation to leave the European Union, that
19
law would prevail. So there is parliamentary sovereignty in that
sense. Yes, Parliament alone is free to repeal the Human Rights
20
Act. So there is parliamentary sovereignty in that sense, one not
shared by the legislatures of Canada and the United States. Yes,
in theory the Westminster Parliament might rescind Scottish
devolution, though the real life chances of that ever happening
hover barely above zero. Still, all that and more conceded, today's
parliamentary sovereignty looks to be an enervated version of
what existed a mere half century ago. In today's world, in my
opinion, if you are looking for non-emasculated parliamentary
sovereignty you need to look to New Zealand rather than Britain.
3. THE RULE OF RECOGNITION
Any revolution severs to some extent or other what had
been until then that jurisdiction's "rule of recognition." As I noted
above, that term was coined by the legal philosopher H.L.A.
21
Hart, and it refers to a jurisdiction's ultimate test of legal validity,
the ultimate ground of legal authority where law runs out and
morality and politics are what must be appealed to for
justification.
We have seen already how the hereditary principle was
severed in the Glorious Revolution, though that breach was
finessed and disguised as far as was plausible. That was a breach
of a core element of the then rule of recognition. And then there
were the substantive obstacles in the path of establishing a new
monarchy, and so in part at least a new rule of recognition. These
"arose most acutely in connection with the design and
administration of the oaths to the new king and queen'' (p. 144).
How did the conscientious man who took his earlier oath to King
James seriously, how did that man swear now that William and
Mary were the "lawful and rightful" (p. 146) sovereigns, as the
traditional oath demanded? The only pathway out of this
19. The Conservative Party has promised a referendum on this issue, which if it
delivered a 'leave' result, would presumahly also deliver that outcome via legislation.
20. And indeed a significant portion of the Conservative party wishes to do just that.
See Helen Warrell, Conservative Party Sets Sights on Scrapping /Iuman Rights Act,
FINANCIAL TIMES (May 11, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e2ac115a-17f0-11e4-962h00144fcah7de.html#axzz3a6pvlgSB.
21. HART, supra note 4, at 97, 9Y.
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dilemma was to redesign the oath, and make no reference to
"rightful and lawful" nor include any promise of continuing
loyalty to William and Mary's "heirs and successors" (p. 146).
Instead, the oath was pared down to a bare minimum, where one
would "sincerely promise and swear that [he] will be faithful and
bear true allegiance to [William and Mary]" (p. 146). Such are the
foundations on which successful revolutions, and revamped rules
of recognition, are built.
As Kay puts it, this "streamlined oath was one
manifestation of the de facto theory of allegiance" (p. 146). It sidestepped the issue of whether William's title was legal or not,
merely specifying what the oath taker would do. Better yet, it
worked as a gloss on the law of treason, it being a serious problem
for subjects in times of civil strife and revolution to decide exactly
who was the king. "The de facto doctrine provided a defense for
those who ended up choosing incorrectly" (p. 147)..
Of course every new rule of recognition starts with events
that were not themselves authorized under the old rule of
recognition. Or, in Kay's blunter terms, "[a]lllaw ... starts with
revolution. It follows that, to the extent that a society values the
rule of law, the illegal origin of every legal system subverts its own
legitimacy" (p. 272). Yet, this slowly fades with the passage of
time. "At some point the revolution ceases to be seen as a rupture
in the old law but as the founding of a new one" (p. 272). How
quickly this occurs will vary, no doubt depending in part upon how
the previous rule of recognition was perceived. Yet., as time passes
the rationale for that revolution can safely become ever more
radical. In the year 1709 in England the Whigs attempted to recharacterize the Revolution's rationale from being "a simple
application of accepted legal rules to unusual circumstances [to
being] an exercise of justified resistance against an oppressive
king" (p. 274), in the course of the impeachment of the preacher
Henry Sacheverell. It was too soon. The attempt failed. "[T]hey
could not overcome the force of the legalist explanation" (p. 276).
"Popular opinion was on Sacheverell's side" (p. 279). He escaped
with no fine and no imprisonment, the toast of the town. In the
parliamentary elections that followed soon afterwards, the Whigs
were crushed.
Yet "[l]ittle by little ... it became safer to describe the
Revolution accurately-as the overturning of one legal system
and the inauguration of a new one" (p. 279). By the 1760s,
Blackstone was doing it; Samuel Johnson was doing it; by the

2015]

BOOK REVIEWS

519

1790s, Edmund Burke was too. The rule of recognition had
changed and it was now acceptable to say so.
For the legal philosopher, however, there is the
fundamental issue of how to understand our rule of recognition.
As Larry Alexander puts it: "[W]hat is our rule of recognition? I
regard that question as one of the two most difficult questions in
22
legal philosophy. " Hart famously saw the rule of recognition as
a source-based test that focused on officials; to find the ultimate
test of legal validity you look to see, from amongst the pool of
social rules in a jurisdiction, which ones (~fficials accepted, and
were prepared to apply as legal rules. The criteria the officials
accept as determinative of legal validity give us a jurisdiction's test
of legal validity.
The attractive thing about Hart's rule-based concept of law,
with his account of the rule of recognition recounted from the
23
outsider's vantage, is that it can be applied to any legal system,
ever. Application of the Hartian framework is not restricted to
some nice benevolent Western legal system. You can apply it to
feudal systems, Stalinist Russia, the United States today,
anywhere. Dworkin, by contrast, with his theory of law built out
of a theory of how best to interpret, offers a legal theory of next
to no application in non-democracies, or indeed in any jurisdiction
without an independent (and possibly a common-law-based)
judiciary. His can be applied only to a miniscule fraction of the
legal systems the world has seen.
The near universal applicability of Hart's theory is, to my way
of thinking, a big advantage. Yet Alexander points out a problem
for Hart. "One would think, however, that citizens as well as
officials would have to accept those criteria, lest the officials
would be nothing more than 'the gunman writ large' vis-a-vis the
24
citizens. " As Alexander explains in a footnote, Hart had
attacked Austin's (and, I might add, perhaps indirectly, also
Bentham's) command theory of law, not least because it "could
25
not distinguish laws from the threats of gunmen." And any rule
of recognition test focused on what officials accept certainly
seems vulnerable, in many jurisdictions, to being collapsed into
the gunman writ large scenario- the very one Hart tried to evade
22. Larry Alexander, Constitutional Theories: A Taxonomy and (Implicit) Critique,
51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623,642 (2014) (emphasis in the original).
23. See JAMES ALLAN, TilE VANTAGE OF LAW: ITS ROLE IN THINKING ABOUT
LAW, JUDGING AND BILLS OF RIGHTS (2011 ).
24. Alexander, supra note 22, at 642 (internal footnote omitted).
25. /d. at 642 n.106.
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by moving to a rule-based concept of law. In other words, the
widespread applicability of Hart's understanding of the rule of
recognition comes at a cost, some would say a hefty cost.
Alexander's alternative, to look at what criteria "citizens as
well as officials" 26 would accept, seems to me to take us back to a
theory of Dworkin-like levels of applicability. In a nice,
benevolent, democratic, Western jurisdiction, such as the United
States, we can ask what the people (as well as officials) have
accepted as determinative of legal validity. I doubt, though, that
the question is worth asking in North Korea. Of course, even
limited in the way Alexander does to a jurisdiction such as the
United States, finding an answer may surpass us all. As Alexander
makes clear, popular acquiescence when top judges depart from
the prior understanding of what a Constitution means is not
enough, not unless people knew it in fact was a departure. And
how do we test for that?
The rule of recognition is a slippery concept. This may just
be one of those "pay your money and pick your poison"
situations. If forced to choose, I think on balance [prefer Hart's
understanding, though any choice carries costs. Yet my larger
point is that Kay's wonderful book throws issues such as these into
the seventeenth-century setting of the Glorious Revolution and
makes you think again about them.
As I said to start, the book is a joy to read. If I were pushed
to find fault, it would be with the index, which was a tad truncated
given the nature of the book. But that is the merest of quibbles.
This is a book worth buying.

26.

!d. at 642.

